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T
he widespread adoption of inflation targets by
numerous central banks, starting with the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand in 1990, prompted several
analysts to be concerned that policymakers might pursue
price stability at the expense of economic stability. That is,
policymakers might become what Mervyn King referred
to as “inflation nutters”—policymakers who place “weight
only on inflation and none at all on output stabilization”
in the conduct of monetary policy.1 I argue that there are
several reasons central banks might want to operate under
what Laurence Meyer calls a “hierarchical mandate,” that is,
where the principal objective is price stability and policy-
makers do not pursue economic stabilization policy unless
their price stability objective has been achieved.2
The first reason monetary policymakers might be well
served to operate under a hierarchical mandate is that
changes in the money supply have no long-run effects on
the economy. This is referred to as “monetary neutrality.”
Although it is not necessarily true that a permanent change
in the inflation rate has no permanent effect on the real
economy, Bullard and Keating find that in the United States
and several other industrialized countries this is the case—
monetary policy is “super neutral.”3 Moreover, as they note,
from the perspective of pure theory, the long-run effect of
a permanent increase in the inflation rate is uncertain—it
can be positive, negative, or zero. There is no uncertainty
about a central bank’s ability to control inflation in the long
run; however, effective inflation control depends critically
on well-anchored inflation expectations.
The second reason is that the policy option faced by
policymakers is a function of the structure of the economy,
the source of the shock, and whether the shock is tempo-
rary or permanent. For some shocks and some economic
structures, policy actions that stabilize output in the short
run also stabilize prices. In such fortuitous circumstances,
policymakers need not choose between stabilizing output
or stabilizing inflation. Unfortunately, for other shocks
and other economic structures policymakers are forced to
choose between stabilizing output and stabilizing inflation.
As Bernanke (2004) notes,
[I]f monetary policies are chosen optimally and the
economic structure is held constant, there exists a long-
run tradeoff between volatility in output and volatility in
inflation.
The ultimate source of this long-run tradeoff is the
existence of shocks to aggregate supply…Hence, in the
standard framework, the periodic occurrence of shocks to
aggregate supply (such as oil price shocks) forces policy-
makers to choose between stabilizing output and stabilizing
inflation. Note that shocks to aggregate demand do not
create the same tradeoff, as offsetting an aggregate demand
shock stabilizes both output and inflation.4
When faced with a supply shock, an attempt to mitigate
its effect on prices exacerbates the effect on output and an
attempt to mitigate its effect on output exacerbates the effect
on prices. A hierarchical mandate would alleviate concerns
that policymakers might jeopardize their long-run price
stability objective for some short-run gain in economic
stability because of political pressure or for other reasons.
Policymakers might also prefer to operate under a hier-
archical mandate because of the likelihood that price stabil-
ity is good for long-term economic growth and economic
stability for a variety of reasons. Bernanke (2004) notes
that the Great Moderation—the sharp reduction in the
variability of real output growth and other economic vari-
ables from the mid-1980s to the beginning of the current
financial crisis—could not have been a consequence of “a
conscious attempt by policymakers to try to moderate the
variability of inflation,” because such actions would have
led to “higher, not lower, variability of output.” He then
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and more stable inflation may have caused enhanced eco-
nomic stability. Low and stable inflation might have (1)
“led to stabilizing changes in the structure of the economy,”
(2) affected “the size and frequency of shocks hitting the
economy,” (3) changed “the sensitivity of pricing and other
economic decisions to exogenous outside events,” and (4)
reduced the likelihood of destabilizing “‘inflation scares.’”
Finally, policymakers might prefer a hierarchical mandate
because the more firmly anchored are inflation expectations,
the more aggressively policymakers will be able to pursue
economic stability. This approach is reflected in the Fed’s
monetary policy in 2003. The Federal Open Market
Committee [FOMC] had reduced its target for the funds
rate to 1.0 percent, then a historically low level. By December
2003, FOMC meeting economic data indicated that real
gross domestic product increased at a 3.3 percent rate in
the second quarter and at a very rapid 8.2 percent rate in
the third. Chairman Greenspan noted that it “has almost
invariably been the case that the Federal Reserve would
tighten under such conditions.”5 However, with little con-
cern about accelerating inflation, presumably a consequence
of well-anchored inflation expectations, the FOMC did
not increase its funds rate target until June 2004, when it
began increasing the target slowly at a “measured pace.”6
For all of these reasons, I suggest the Fed and perhaps
other central bankers would do well to adopt a hierarchi-
cal mandate. More generally, policymakers should not
think of price stability and economic stability as compet-
ing objectives that must be somehow weighted in the con-
duct of monetary policy. Rather they should think of price
stability and economic stability as complements—the best
way to achieve the latter is to be firmly commited to
achieving the former. ￿
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